Isidor Brodersen: Das Spiel mit der Vergangenheit in der Zweiten Sophistik. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2023 (Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 86). 244 p. € 49.00. ISBN: 978-3-515-13534-4.

To a certain extent, the title of the monograph under review, "Playing with the Past in the Second Sophistic", is misleading. Rather than on playing with the past, it focuses on playing with *personae*. These *personae* are the 'narrators' created by Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides and Lucian in the texts that make up the corpus studied by Isidor Brodersen, which were supposedly scrutinised and questioned by ancient audiences. Discussion of these texts constitutes the second half of the study (chapters 4–6: "Dion von Prusa", pp. 63–120; "Aelius Aristides", pp. 121–145; "Lukian von Samosata", pp. 146–210).[1] In the first three chapters, Brodersen outlines and argues his approach ("Einleitung"; pp. 9–17; "Das Spiel mit der Vergangenheit", pp. 18–46; "Vergangenheit als *paideia*. Der Bildungskanon als Diskursinstrument", pp. 47–62). The book closes with a concluding chapter ("Fazit. Grundtendenzen des Spiels mit der Vergangenheit", pp. 211–220), a bibliography (pp. 221–239), and an *index locorum* (pp. 241–244). A general index is missing.

Brodersen's approach is informed by a basic tenet of narratology: the distinction between 'author' and 'narrator'. Given the (ostensibly) oral nature of a large part of his corpus, Brodersen prefers the term 'speaker' ("Sprecher", "Sprecherinstanz") to 'narrator'. The speaker constitutes a separate entity, shaped and informed by, but not coinciding with, the author. Scholars dealing with the literary output of the Second Sophistic, especially ancient historians, are often inclined to underestimate the importance of this distinction (p. 19). This frequently results in first-person narrators being identified with authors and their utterances being taken as evidence of the latter's biography, opinions and attitudes. The thoroughly problematic nature of this procedure is one of the recurring themes in "Das Spiel mit der Vergangenheit". It therefore deserves to be prioritised in the discussion.

1 Parts of these chapters draw on previous publications by I. Brodersen: Lukians "Wie man Geschichte schreiben soll" ... und andere Geschichten über Redlichkeit. Hamburg 2018 (Mainzer Althistorische Studien 8); id.: Homer's Lies and Dio's Truth? Subverting the Epic Past in Dio Chrysostom's *Trojan Oration*. In: P. Bassino/N. Benzi (eds.): Sophistic Views of the Epic Past from the Classical to the Imperial Age. London/New York 2022 (Bloomsbury Classical Studies Monographs), pp. 165–185.

It must be acknowledged that it is not unusual for the words of a first-person speaker to be taken as evidence about the author. Given the art of tendentious and/or playful self-representation practised by authors, Brodersen is entirely correct to point out the risks involved in taking such utterances at face value ("für bare Münze", p. 21). Still, his position entails the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Clearly, historians must never take their sources at face value. But discarding textual evidence because its authors are prone to elusive or deceptive self-representation is a luxury that ancient historians simply cannot afford. Instead, they should gratefully accept the insights of their colleagues from the literary side of Academia as tools with which to analyse, scrutinise, and question the evidence, rather than brushing it aside. Even Brodersen himself apparently leaves some room for the utilisation of first-person information. For example, although he states that modern scholarship is rightly ("zu Recht", p. 34) more sceptical when dealing with Lucian's biography than with those of Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides, he accepts Lucian's non-Greek origin because it is also mentioned in remarks in passing ("häufig genug auch in beiläufigen Bemerkungen Thema", p. 36). Brodersen does not elaborate further on such attempts to formulate criteria for accepting or rejecting autobiographical information, probably because his brief biographical sketches of Dio, Aristides, and Lucian (pp. 24–31; 32–34; 34–37) are primarily intended to demonstrate how little can be said with certainty ("wie wenig sich tatsächlich mit Gewissheit sagen lässt", p. 23). Incidentally, his objections to using Aristides' *Sacred Tales* for biographical information are very meagre, and the work of the late Charles Behr certainly deserves better than to be dismissed because he had the intellectual integrity sometimes to correct himself (p. 32).[2]

Apparently, Brodersen thinks that a biographical, "production-oriented approach" is a dead-end. Instead, he opts for a "reception-oriented approach" (p. 23), which separates texts from their authors and their alleged ideas (pp. 14–15). Rather than mining texts for information about their authors, one should take them as discourse instruments that transcend individuals,

2 Cf. on the merits of Behr's work on Aristides S. Swain: Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250. Oxford 1996, p. 254, n. 3: "[...] fundamental to understanding the background and structure of the *Sacred Tales*." J. Downie: At the Limits of Art. A Literary Study of Aelius Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi*. Oxford/New York 2013, p. 26: "Thanks to his painstaking attention to chronology, Behr's work has been fundamental for all subsequent research on Aristides."

and ask which modes of reception they contain. When answering this question, one should – as far as speeches are concerned – look beyond the audiences attending performances and primarily take into account the "extradiegetic audience" (p. 41), i.e. the readers (pp. 15–16 and 41–42). If such readers possessed an adequate amount of *paideia*, they could perceive and question all aspects of the literary form of texts, both macrostructurally (the result of the author's staging strategies) and through 'close reading' on a more detailed level. This perceptive and inquisitive reception constitutes the play referred to in the title of Brodersen's monograph (p. 17). Its playground was the reading room or the symposium rather than the auditorium, council, or assembly (p. 59). The past comes into play in that *paideia* amounted to a close familiarity with the language and literary output of Classical Athens, with Greek history of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, and with Homeric myth (pp. 49–50). For members of the civic elites in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, *paideia* was an emblem of excellence and displaying it was a form of self-affirmation (p. 56).

Brodersen acknowledges the problems with his reception-oriented approach, conceding that it is impossible to accurately recreate the experiences of ancient readers. Nevertheless, he argues that it is possible to identify interpretations that would have been more or less plausible to ancient readers of the texts that make up his corpus (p. 46). While I won't argue with that, the clues Brodersen uses to get access to the interpretations available to ancient readers do not invariably inspire confidence. He assumes that misquotations, mythical scenes taken out of context, flawed comparisons with historical events or persons, and anachronisms were not errors, but were deliberately created by the author ("Autorinstanz") to force the "extradiegetic audience" (p. 62) into critical activity,[3] and that the intended readership was capable of recognising such incongruities, either during individual reading or in a symposium context. But did authors never expect to get away with a flawed comparison? Were they never taken in by the mistaken identity implied in a wandering anecdote? Was the readership always inclined to consider the original context of a quotation when evaluating an argument to which it was appended? Does the reverent attitude to the past assumed in such clues not run counter to the supposed playfulness of the exercise? Ultimately, my

3 I notice in passing that at this point the author re-enters the stage.

questions boil down to how often these signals were intended and/or received and how often the interpretations that Brodersen deems 'plausible' actually arose in a private library or at a dinner party. This is a problem that Brodersen acknowledges but cannot solve.[4] Neither can I, but I find it hard to share his optimistic expectations. To be fair, I should add that Brodersen acknowledges the possibility of different modes of reception among the *pepaideumenoi*, admitting that the quest for allusions and signals is just one option ("Das Spiel mit verschiedenen Publika", pp. 214–215). Nevertheless, his own readings strongly focus on the possibility of discovering signals that invite readers to engage with the text critically.

As the proof of the pudding is in the eating, let us turn to Brodersen's discussion of his corpus, which comprises a selection of texts by Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, and Lucian, as we saw above. A complete coverage of the texts would be beyond the scope of a review, so I will be selective and brief. I will discuss Brodersen's treatment of Dio's or. 47 (*Public speech in his fatherland*), or. 33 (*First Tarsian Oration*) and or. 34 (*Second Tarsian Oration*); of Aristides' declamations (orr. 5–16); and of Lucian's *Alexander or the False Prophet*.

Or. 47 is a speech delivered in the assembly of Prusa in defence of a building project initiated by Dio. In this speech, Brodersen perceives a couple of clear signals that suggest to him that Dio did not just have his fellow citizens (the 'intradiegetic' audience) in mind, but also expected his speech to be received by an 'extradiegetic' readership afterwards (pp. 75–78). The first of these is a selective retelling of the myth of Heracles, in which the hero's humiliating tasks (cleaning stables, etc.), culminating in a descent into the underworld, are highlighted (or. 47.4). Listing these labours illustrates that even Heracles failed to earn the respect of his fellow citizens, despite his efforts on their behalf. A comparison with the lack of gratitude of the citizens of Prusa towards Dio is, of course, implied. Brodersen points out that the myth has been condensed to the extent that the penitential nature of Heracles' labours – he had killed his own children in a fit of madness – is omitted. The speaker places his own munificence on the same level as Heracles' atonements, which Brodersen considers to be a striking incongruity that must have been apparent to readers of the speech. They could detach it from the assembly

4 "Die in den Texten angelegten Signale für eine bestimmte Lesart können und müssen nicht von allen Rezipienten wahrgenommen werden" (p. 214).

debate in Prusa and read it as an invitation to reflect on notions of merit, role models, and the common good.[5]

I think that the incongruity disappears when one considers the audience's expectations and realises that suppressing the link between Heracles killing his children, his penitential servitude to Eurystheus, and his twelve labours was not particularly innovative. Idealising Heracles as a paragon of virtue and a role model for the (Cynic) philosopher had been a convention since the Classical period.[6] Isocrates, for example, omits the mythological context when citing the labours of Heracles as virtuous deeds to be emulated by his addressee (*Ad Demonicum* 7–8).[7] Dio's exploitation of the malleability of myth will not have struck his audience, intra- or extradiegetic, as odd or 'incongruent', and I fail to recognise it as a signal or invitation to readers of the speech to reflect on anything other than Dio's righteous anger about the ingratitude of his fellow citizens.

The second signal that Brodersen discovers in this assembly speech in Prusa is a Homeric quotation. The speaker quotes *Odyssey* 10.38–39 within a passage in which he puts advice addressed to himself into the mouth of a political opponent (or. 47.22). Ironically, he presents his opponent's words as friendly advice, when actually his opponent is admonishing him to withdraw from city politics. Brodersen argues that, in this case, the original context of the quoted lines is relevant: they are spoken by one of Odysseus' companions before they open the bag in which Aeolus has confined the unfavourable winds. Brodersen is of course right that the origin of the quotation adds an extra edge to the characterization by speech of Dio's opponent. Whether *pepaideumenoi* would have needed to read the speech in order to grasp the point, as Brodersen seems to claim, is another matter. However, he is certainly right to point out that the speech provided ample opportunity to both listeners and readers to display their *paideia* (p. 78).

5 "Die Rede muss hier zumindest teilweise vom Anlass gelöst und als Angebot gelesen werden, über Verdienst und Nichtverdienst, über Vorbildfunktionen und Gemeinwohl nachzudenken und zu diskutieren" (p. 77).

6 For a brief, but instructive summary, see E. Stafford: Herakles. London/New York 2012 (Gods and Heroes of the Ancient World), pp. 121–129.

7 Admittedly, in one of the 'Diogenic' speeches (or. 8.29 and 33), Dio has the founder of Cynicism explicitly deny that Heracles performed his labours to serve and to please Eurystheus. The Isocratean precedent shows that this was unnecessary in the present context.

Already in his introduction (p. 16), Brodersen suggests that the relationship between the Greek elite and Rome is largely marginal in the texts of his corpus. This observation is reiterated in the conclusion to the section on Dio's paraenetic speeches (p. 90). Disappointingly, Brodersen does not discuss the *Second Tarsian Oration* (or. 34) in this section, despite promising his readers that he would (p. 79). This oration contains interesting advice regarding the city's relations with Roman governors (or. 34.15 and 38–42), as well as sharp warnings against inter-city rivalry. The speaker compares such rivalry to squabbles over an ass's shadow (or. 34.48) and quarrels over glory and preeminence between fellow slaves (or. 34.51).[8] The shadow of Rome looms large over the speech: "Precedence and power belong to others" (or. 34.48). The situation of contemporary Greek cities is compared to the vicissitudes of the major Greek city-states of the Classical past (or. 34.49–51). For reasons known best to himself, Brodersen has chosen to disregard this essential part of the evidence for the connection between relations with Rome and playing with the past.

In the case of the *First Tarsian Oration* (or. 33), however, Brodersen keeps his promise to discuss the speech (pp. 87–90). The speaker censures the people of Tarsus for an indecent act alluded to by the word "snoring" (ῥέγκειν). Much ink has been spilled over the question of what the speaker is hinting at by this word, and Brodersen dutifully marshals a number of the proposed solutions. Unfortunately, he overlooks the thorough discussion of the problem by Christina Kokkinia, who convincingly argues that the speaker is hinting at unrestrained flatulence.[9] To me, this suggests that Dio is as much a stand-up comedian here as a moral philosopher (the two roles are, of course, not mutually exclusive). One would love to learn more about how the 'intradiegetic' audience responded.

The reproach of "snoring" only emerges once the speech is well underway (or. 33.33). It begins with an exhaustive preface, in which the audience is informed – or rather warned – of what to expect (or. 33.1–16). The speaker makes it abundantly clear that he is not an encomiastic orator (or. 33.1–3)

8 On or. 34 see C. P. Jones: The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom. Cambridge, MA/London 1978 (Loeb Classical Monographs 12), pp. 76–82; Swain (note 2), pp. 216–219.

9 C. Kokkinia: A Rhetorical Riddle: The Subject of Dio Chrysostom's *First Tarsian Oration*. In: HSPh 103, 2007, pp. 407–422.

nor one of those who are able to extemporise on any subject proposed by the audience (or. 33.4–5) – apparently sophists, although they speak about philosophical subjects rather than adopting a role and declaiming.[10] Such extemporisers' demonstrations are compared to lectures by practitioners of the medical profession who dazzle their audiences with their anatomical expositions (or. 33.6). These showmen are then contrasted with true physicians, whose prescriptions may be unwelcome to their patients (or. 33.6–7). In the continuation, the speaker suggests that the Tarsians should expect precisely such prescriptions: "words of truth" (or. 33.7), "words from philosophy" (or. 33.16).

This part of the speech is barely touched on by Brodersen, which is disappointing once again. In his introduction (p. 16), he claims that no such clear distinction between philosophy and rhetoric is suggested in his corpus as one might expect when using modern (?) categories as a point of reference.[11] This contention would carry more weight if he had confronted it with the self-presentation of the speaker in the *First Tarsian Oration*, who clearly contrasts his own stance as a philosopher with the performances of encomiastic and sophistic orators.[12]

10 Dio's description of these speakers fits very well with Galen's characterisation (*De Praecognitione* 5.11 [Galeni De praecognitione. Edidit, in linguam Anglicam vertit, commentatus est V. Nutton. Berlin 1979 [Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 5,8,1], p. 96,7–19]), of Demetrius of Alexandria, a follower of Favorinus, "who used to lecture daily on suggested themes in the style of Favorinus' discourse" (translation V. Nutton). Apparently, Favorinus was famous for his improvised declamations on philosophical themes. Together, these passages may help to flesh out Philostratus' elusive category of "those who practised philosophy and had a reputation for sophistry" (soph. 479, translation G. Miles).

11 "Es wird [...] keine so klare Trennung von Philosophie und Rhetorik evoziert, wie die modernen Kategorien es vermuten lassen."

12 See for the pose as a philosopher also or. 34.9–10 (where the speaker implicitly compares himself to Socrates) and 13 (where he describes his own appearance as "unkempt"; cf. J. Hahn: Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft. Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit. Stuttgart 1989 [Heidelberger althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien 7], pp. 33–45). The comparison of philosophy, as a therapy of the soul, with medicine and of philosophers with physicians was, of course, commonplace since the Classical period, see e.g. M. Schofield: Academic Therapy: Philo of Larissa and Cicero's Project in the *Tusculans*. In: G. Clark/T. Rajak (eds.): Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin. Oxford/New York 2002, pp. 91–109.

Among the speeches attributed to Aelius Aristides are twelve declamations (*meletai*): eleven are on *hypotheseis* from the Classical past (Peloponnesian War, Leuctra, the road to Chaeronea) and one on a mythological *hypothesis* (*Iliad* 9). Brodersen devotes a section of his chapter on Aristides to these declamations ("*Meletai* und der kreative Umgang mit dem Klassischen", pp. 139–145), focusing on the paired speeches for and against sending reinforcements to the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 BCE (orr. 5–6). These declamations are included because they exemplify the play with the past (p. 145). However, Brodersen's analysis of their function in providing listeners and readers alike with an opportunity to demonstrate their *paideia* ("Ausweis von *paideia*", ibid.) does not substantially add to our understanding of these pieces. Nor does his observation that the pair of speeches heavily depends on Thucydides (p. 143). William Guast has pointed out that, of the surviving declamations from the first to third centuries CE, only those of Aristides have escaped relative scholarly neglect.[13] Brodersen has missed an opportunity here to shed new light on the play with the past by bringing in under-utilised material such as Lucian's *Phalaris* 1 and 2, the pair of declamations on the aftermath of the Battle of Marathon by Polemo, and Herodes Atticus' *Peri politeias*.

With his discussion of Lucian's *Alexander or the False Prophet* (pp. 177–186), Brodersen takes a position in the debate about the extent to which Lucian's defamatory biography of the founder of an oracle in the Paphlagonian city of Abonuteichos can be used as historical evidence. The oracular deity in question was called Glycon. According to Lucian, the cult was created by Alexander. He is portrayed as a fraud who was as brilliant as he was unscrupulous. However, while the cult of Glycon itself is well attested, Lucian is our only source of information regarding its oracular nature and Alexander's role as its founder. The problem has been clearly set out by Andreas Bendlin in an article that was unfortunately overlooked by Brodersen.[14] In fact, Brodersen's position is quite similar to Bendlin's. Although he seems to ac-

13 W. Guast: Greek Declamation Beyond Philostratus' Second Sophistic. In: JHS 139, 2019, pp. 172–186, at p. 172.

14 A. Bendlin: On the Uses and Disadvantages of Divination: Oracles and their Literary Representations in the Time of the Second Sophistic. In: J. A. North/S. R. F. Price (eds.): The Religious History of the Roman Empire. Pagans, Jews, and Christians. Oxford 2011 (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies), pp. 175–250, especially pp. 226–243.

cept the oracular nature of the cult at face value (on p. 186, he refers to "das Glykonorakel von Abonuteichos" without further ado), he questions the historicity of Alexander's involvement.[15]

This position is certainly defendable. Ultimately, however, it amounts to an *argumentum e silentio*. In cases such as these, I would prefer to leave room for different historical scenarios. Ancient historians do not deal in certainties. While it cannot be ruled out that Alexander is a figment of Lucian's malicious imagination, it is also possible that the target of his libel was a member of the local elite of Abonuteichos instrumental in establishing the Glycon cult around the middle of the second century CE. Provided that scholars unequivocally make clear the extent to which their reconstructions are based on Lucian's evidence and carefully argue why they are willing or unwilling to accept specific pieces of information, I would consider this a sound procedure.[16] Sometimes, even Lucianic information that appears to be mischievous invention is confirmed to some extent by external evidence. In *On the death of Peregrinus* (27–28 and 41), for example, Lucian insinuates that the followers of the Cynic philosopher will impute posthumous miraculous healings and oracular activity to their deceased spiritual leader. The Christian apologist Athenagoras tells us that a statue of Peregrinus in his hometown of Parium was said to give oracles (suppl. 26). This is, admittedly, a far cry from the gold statues and the oracular sanctuary at Olympia predicted by Lucian, but it does confirm posthumous cultic activity of an oracular nature, which is a piece of information we might be inclined to discard if we had only Lucian's evidence for it.

Let's go back to *Alexander or the False Prophet*. It is purportedly written at the request of one Celsus, and both the 'speaker' and the addressee are portrayed as ardent followers of the philosophy of Epicurus. Brodersen is right to point out (pp. 181–184) that the speaker undermines his own pose as an adherent of Epicureanism through sheer fanaticism. Brodersen here follows what is now a generally accepted reading, as is clear from his own refer-

15 "Es scheint also zumindest möglich zu sein, dass das vom Sprecher geschilderte Leben des Orakelgründers [...] nicht mit dem historisch belegten Kult in Abonuteichos zusammenhängt" (p. 185). Cf. Bendlin (note 14), p. 243: "[...] the historicity of Alexander, which I continue to doubt."

16 In this respect, the recent commentary by Peter Thonemann is exemplary: Lucian: Alexander or the False Prophet. Translated with Introduction and Commentary by P. Thonemann. Oxford 2021 (Clarendon Ancient History Series).

ences.[17] He adds his conviction that it was primarily the "extradiegetic audience" (p. 181) who could perceive the irony in the speaker's commitment "to take vengeance on Epicurus' behalf" (translation P. Thonemann). Incidentally, Brodersen is correct to assert that the encomium on Epicurus (Alex. 47) is an anomaly in Lucian's oeuvre, but he could have mentioned the presence of Epicurean voices in his other writings.[18] There are interesting parallels between the speaker in the *Alexander* and Tychiades in the *Lovers of Lies*. Daniel Ogden has plausibly argued that Tychiades is also portrayed as an Epicurean – whose voice is drowned out by the superstitious stories told by representatives of other philosophical schools.[19]

Brodersen set out to demonstrate the viability of a reception-centred approach to the literary output of the Second Sophistic, and its potential. On both counts, the present reviewer is unconvinced. In my view, separating texts from both their authors and their original context and focusing exclusively on their reconstructed reception is a rather one-sided exercise that all too often results in unsurprising conclusions. Time and again, we are told that texts contain signals that stimulate readers to question the speaker's self-presentation, probe the content of his words, and display their *paideia*. The repetitiveness of these conclusions makes it difficult for the reader to stay focused, as does the fact that, in quite a few cases, Brodersen's observations do not go beyond what has already been argued by others.[20] Furthermore, when adopting a reception-oriented approach, it is imperative to meticulously reconstruct the audience's expectations. Otherwise, identifying signals that can be picked up by the ('extradiegetic') audience becomes a very sub-

17 R. B. Branham: Unruly Eloquence. Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions. Cambridge, MA/London 1989 (Revealing Antiquity 2), pp. 179–210 is still enlightening.

18 See C. P. Jones: Culture and Society in Lucian. Cambridge, MA/London 1986, pp. 26–27.

19 D. Ogden: In Search of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. The Traditional Tales of Lucian's *Lover of Lies*. Swansea 2007, pp. 20–21.

20 Thus, in his attempts to discover 'critical subtexts' in Aristides' *To Rome* (or. 26) and *Panathenaicus* (or. 1), Brodersen leans heavily on papers by L. Pernot: Aelius Aristides and Rome. In: W. V. Harris/B. Holmes (eds.): Aelius Aristides between Greece, Rome, and the Gods. Leiden/Boston 2008 (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 33), pp. 175–201; and S. C. Jarratt: An Imperial Anti-Sublime: Aristides' *Roman Oration* (*or.* 26). In: L. Pernot/G. Abbamonte/M. Lamagna (eds.): Ælius Aristide écrivain. Turnhout 2016 (Recherches sur les rhétoriques religieuses 19), pp. 213–229.

jective process. In this respect, I found Brodersen's methodology unsatisfactory. His bibliography shows curious omissions. He does not discuss parts of his corpus that could challenge his apparent convictions. Warnings against taking the literary output of the Second Sophistic *at face value* as evidence for authors' biographies and historical events are pertinent and should certainly be heeded.[21] However, as Brodersen's discussion of the biographies of Dio, Aristides, and Lucian is intended to demonstrate the superiority of a reception-oriented approach over a production-oriented one, completeness and fairness are not its most conspicuous virtues. In fact, it is tantamount to advising historians to refrain from attempting to derive biographical and historical information from literary sources. Some advice on how to avoid pitfalls would have been more helpful. Overall, I didn't find reading "Das Spiel mit der Vergangenheit" a very rewarding experience.

21 If I were to write my 1997 note "The Date of Lucian's Visit to Abonouteichos" (In: ZPE 119, 1997, pp. 280–282) now, I would rather give it the title 'The Dramatic Date of Lucian's *Alexander* 55–56', leaving the question of historicity aside.

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